The transition to a circular economy in Iran given the institutional and structural complexities requires governance models adapted to the local context. Focusing on a case study of the chemical and petrochemical industries and the chemical–plastic value chain, this study addresses a gap in the literature by linking firm-level incentives with inter-industry collaboration and macro level regulatory design. It asks how novel multistakeholder governance patterns can facilitate the circular-economy transition in these sectors.
The research adopts an exploratory qualitative approach with a multiple-embedded case design. Data were collected through 20 semi-structured interviews with governmental, industrial, and civil-society actors, alongside 12 official policy and industry documents. A four-stage thematic analysis was conducted in MAXQDA 24. Data trustworthiness was ensured through triangulation, member checking, and peer debriefing, with inter-coder reliability of κ = 0.82. Theoretical saturation was reached after the 18th interview.
Three governance models were identified: firm-centric, industry-centric and cross-sectoral. Integrative propositions indicate that: (G1) regulatory pressure alone leads to superficial transitions without network building; (G2) cluster sustainability depends on jointly agreed quality standards and transparent pricing; and (G3) adaptive state leadership is essential to bridge industry-centric to cross-sectoral governance and to phase out long-term subsidies. Accordingly, a multi-level intervention portfolio is proposed: full enforcement of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) and green loans (short-term), a national secondary-material marketplace and industry coordination nodes (medium-term), and deployment of Digital Product Passports (DPP) alongside a gradual subsidy phase-out (long-term). Future research should quantitatively test the proposed models across other energy-intensive sectors and develop performance indicators for circularity.
Purpose/Aims:
The study aims to answer how novel multistakeholder governance models can accelerate the CE transition of Iranian heavy industries. Anchored in the theoretical streams of stakeholder governance, sustainability transitions, and circular-economy policy, it conceptualises three ideal-type patterns (firm-centric, industry-centric, and cross-sectoral). The research seeks to fill a double gap in the literature: first, the relative neglect of coordinated stakeholder governance in emerging-economy CE debates; and second, the scarcity of empirically grounded models that link micro-level organisational motives to meso-level industrial collaboration and macro-level regulatory design.
Methodology & Framework:
Adopting an exploratory, interpretivist stance, the study deploys a qualitative multiple‑embedded case design. Twenty key informants covering state regulators, senior managers in public and private petrochemical conglomerates, cluster and trade‑association representatives, academics, municipal waste officials, and NGO activists were recruited through criterion‑based purposive sampling to ensure breadth of perspectives. Semi‑structured interviews averaging 70 minutes each were conducted, audio‑recorded, transcribed verbatim, anonymised, and complemented by twelve policy and industry documents (laws, standards, market reports). A four‑stage thematic procedure open, axial, selective, integrative was executed in MAXQDA 24, yielding 98 first‑order codes, 12 aggregate categories, and three major themes corresponding to the hypothesised governance patterns. Inter‑coder reliability achieved κ = 0.82; data saturation was confirmed after interview 18. Credibility was reinforced through triangulation of data types, member checking with three informants, and peer debriefing by two external scholars. Trustworthiness criteria of transferability, dependability, and confirmability were addressed via thick description, audit trail, and reflexive memos.
Findings:
The firm‑centric pattern dominates incumbents whose primary motive is cost savings and regulatory risk hedging. Energy‑recovery retrofits and minimal compliance with Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) standards reduce operational expenditure by up to 18 percent yet generate little inter‑firm synergy; χ² tests show significantly lower co‑occurrence with collaboration codes (p < 0.01). The industry‑centric pattern materialises through cluster platforms that institutionalise secondary‑material exchanges and joint technical working groups. A plastics consortium’s marketplace for polypropylene scrap cut disposal costs by 35 percent and raised recycled‑granulate acceptance from 42 to 65 percent within three years. The cross‑sectoral pattern, enabled by outcome‑based regulation plus targeted green finance, features “industry coordination nodes” (ICNs) where government sets macro targets while delegating tool selection to self‑organised alliances. Green credit from the National Environmental Fund shortened payback periods of chemical‑recycling lines from 7.2 to 4.8 years. Comparative synthesis reveals an evolutionary spectrum: initial cost‑defensive firm actions expand into intra‑cluster economies of scale before maturing into multi‑level, multi‑actor ecosystems. Three integrative propositions emerge: G1—regulation alone cannot deepen transition without network effects; G2—cluster durability hinges on jointly endorsed quality standards and transparent pricing; G3 adaptive state leadership is indispensable for bridging industry‑centric initiatives to cross‑sectoral regimes while phasing out persistent subsidies.
Discussion:
The research evidence fundamentally reframes the transition to a Circular Economy (CE) not merely as a discrete technological leap, but as a staged co-evolution of incentives, trust, and institutional complexity. By positioning the proposed multistakeholder framework against established paradigms, the analysis highlights distinct structural advantages:

Contrast with good governance: Unlike the good-governance model which primarily emphasizes oversight, the proposed framework introduces a “value-creation loop” facilitated by participatory platforms.
Contrast with collaborative governance: Relative to collaborative governance, it embeds explicit economic instruments designed to lock in collective gains.
Contrast with polycentric governance: Vis-à-vis polycentric governance, it effectively balances decentralized experimentation with strategic state orchestration to ensure cohesive progress.

Conclusion & Implications:
Policy Implications and Intervention Portfolio
The findings crystallize into a multilevel intervention portfolio essential for operationalizing the transition:

Short-term: Make Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) fully enforceable and capitalize a concessional Green Loan Facility.
Medium-term: Launch a national secondary-material exchange and operationalize Industry Coordination Nodes (ICNs) in five key industrial hubs.
Long-term: Deploy a circular data spine underpinned by mandatory Digital Product Passports and implement a sunset schedule for eco-subsidies to prevent path dependence.

Addressing systemic obstacles—specifically policy discontinuity, inter-agency overlap, data deficits, SME capacity gaps, and cultural inertia—requires embedding this portfolio in statutory development plans, instituting an inter-ministerial steering committee, adopting blockchain-based traceability, offering subsidised technical assistance, and mandating sustainability disclosures.