Volume 16, Issue 4 (2016)
QJER 2016, 16(4): 1-17 |
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1- Professor of Economics, University of Tehran
2- Ph.D. Candidate of Economics, University of Tehran
2- Ph.D. Candidate of Economics, University of Tehran
Abstract: (8628 Views)
According to the Holy Islam, there are mutual relationships between citizens and the state in an Islamic society; which imply complement duties for both sides. The Sharia has defined different responsibilities for the citizens, which in accordance with the Islamic state will result in a better society. Among these responsibilities is the reaction of a Muslim when witnessing a crime in the society. By using the game theory approach we have studied the consequences of two Islamic orders, i.e. enjoining right and forbidding wrong. We have modeled the reactions of the people when seeing a crime in the society in the framework of a strategic game with VNM preferences. The results show that not paying enough attention to these two valuable orders would reduce the individual and social utility. In other words, if people follow the enjoining right and forbidding wrong, the economic and social costs of crime for the society will decrease and the social welfare will increase.
Received: 2014/06/15 | Accepted: 2016/01/20 | Published: 2016/11/21
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