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The purpose of this article is to find out if the use of different Technical Trading Rules provide higher returns than the Simple Trading Rules and whether the former has a more predicting power when it comes to stock prices. Some researchers have shown that the technical rules have been quit successful in newly established markets such as in Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand even though they have not been very successful in the markets of developed countries such as in Japan and Hong Kong. Some economists consider the inefficiency of some of today's markets as good opportunities to employ the technical approach to make a profit. This paper examines the level of profitability of trading using the Moving Averages Rules at the Tehran Stock Exchange Market. The results show that using variable length moving average rules yield a higher profitability when compared to the simple trading rules even though the profitability rates are different given different time length. Moreover, it was observed that the short-run moving averages yield better results than the long-run moving averages.

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Achieving economic growth requires an optimal allocation system of resources at national level. This is not possible without a perfect and efficient financial market. The stock exchange as a part of capital market can provide the required national financial resources and lead to economic growth. In the capital market, information is regarded as the most valuable asset. The more the transparency of information in the stock exchange, the lower the information asymmetry and the more efficient capital market will be. This study aims to analyze the effects of the ownership share of institutional investors, the board size, the role of non-executive board and separation of chief executive officer and chairman of the board roles (separation variable) on information asymmetry in the stock exchange. It estimates a panel data regression for the companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) during the fourth national development plan. The results indicate that the ownership share of institutional investors and board size have negative effects on information asymmetry, while the ratio of non-executive members to board size and separation variable have no significant effects on information asymmetry.