Jafar Ebadi, Ghahramn Abdoli, Malihe Hadadmoghadam,
Volume 15, Issue 4 (2-2016)
Abstract
The various types of unemployment have been key subjects of economics from the past periods. Sometimes, unemployment is the result of improper distribution of labor force. According to the statistical data, medical labor market in Iran is faced with such a problem. The density of medical labor in metropolitan areas is high. As a result, this market is of supply surplus. On the other hand, Iran’s towns and suburbs experience demand surplus. This type of unemployment indicates a kind of market failure, which needs to design a market as a solution. Market design as a subset of game theory requires developing through collaborative efforts of a wide range of specialists. In this article, we analyze medical labor market using the matching theory as a subset of market design. This theory is a main subset of market design theory. We apply a hypothetical market; provide a model and present suggestions to amend the medical labor market in Iran.
Jalal Molabeigi, Dr Jaafar Ebadi, Dr Mohammad Ali Amirzargar,
Volume 18, Issue 4 (12-2018)
Abstract
In the real world, dispersion of suppliers and demanders prevents market formation. Kidney market is a true example of such markets that is not formed due to thin features. To tackle the problem, one needs to design a mechanism that can both revive the market and ensure the most efficient supply-demand matching. A matching is efficient when no other matching can allocate agents to a better place, or cannot strongly allocate an agent to a better place. To this end, the mechanism should be designed to allocate agents to their highest preferences, so that agents cannot make another better choice. In this study, information on 20 patient-donor pairs was recorded at a clearing house in Hamedan province in 2016. After processing data, the patients’ preferences were ordered in terms of matching blood group, illness period, donor’s age, kinship relationship with donor, and gender of donor. Then, a mechanism was designed to match 17 patients with the most efficient kidneys. When patient ith matches donor ith and registers at the clearing house, the mechanism can offer her/his the most efficient kidney. If a given patient finds a donor better than his/her peer donor, then he/she will leave his/her peer donor. Otherwise, he/she matches her paired donor.
