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Objective: Prostate cancer is one of the most common cancer in the developed countries. Most of cancer deaths are due to development of metastasis. Hence, prevention of metastasis is critical. Silibinin is a flavonoid component that inhibits cell proliferation and causes cell death of human prostate cancer. In this study, the expression of CD82 gene in PC-3 cells treated with escalating concentrations of silibinin was evaluated which can result in new view for prostate cancer therapy. Materials and Methods: In this study, PC-3 cells were treated with different concentrations of silibinin for 24h. The LD50 was determined. RNA was extracted by trizol, then cDNA was synthesized. Precise primers were designed for CD82 and GAPDH genes by specific software. Quantity of CD82 gene expression compare to GAPDH gene in different concentrations of silibilin was analyzed using very sensitive quantitative Real-time PCR. Results: CD82 gene expression in PC-3 cells treated with 100, 150 and 200μg/ml of silibinin at 24h was increased by 1.97±0.26 (P<0.05), 3.00±0.26 and 3.43±0.43 (P<0.01), respectively. Conclusion: The results of quantitative Real-time PCR indicated that silibinin can probably decrease metastasis, by up-regulation of CD82 metastasis suppressor gene in PC-3 cells.

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In the holy sharia of Islam, there are rules and regulations for all kinds of transactions. Some of transactions are forbidden. The rule of denial of Gharar is one of these forbidden transactions. According to this rule, all transactions, which face with risk resulting from ambiguity in the deal, ambiguity in ability to give or receive goods or ambiguity in the essential characteristics of the deal, in such a way these terminate to loss are forbidden. In this paper, the rule of denial of Gharar as one of main economic rules of Islam is examined using game theory technique. The main purpose of this paper is to show the futility reasons of Gharar deals in Islam. In this regard, a hypothetical Gharar transaction is modeled in the framework of game with asymmetric information, and its consequences for the society are investigated. The results show that disregarding this valuable Islamic rule imposes extra costs on society and decreases the social utility. It is demonstrated that if the problem of asymmetric information is resolved, the possibility of Gharar transactions will be reduced and the welfare of the society will be enhanced.