Volume 14, Issue 4 (2015)                   QJER 2015, 14(4): 1-22 | Back to browse issues page

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Makiyan S, Raeisi M. The Effect of Corporate Governance on Asymmetric Information (The Case of Tehran Exchange Market). QJER. 2015; 14 (4) :1-22
URL: http://journals.modares.ac.ir/article-18-924-en.html
1- Associate Professor of Economics, Yazd University
2- MA Student
Abstract:   (8464 Views)
Achieving economic growth requires an optimal allocation system of resources at national level. This is not possible without a perfect and efficient financial market. The stock exchange as a part of capital market can provide the required national financial resources and lead to economic growth. In the capital market, information is regarded as the most valuable asset. The more the transparency of information in the stock exchange, the lower the information asymmetry and the more efficient capital market will be. This study aims to analyze the effects of the ownership share of institutional investors, the board size, the role of non-executive board and separation of chief executive officer and chairman of the board roles (separation variable) on information asymmetry in the stock exchange. It estimates a panel data regression for the companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) during the fourth national development plan. The results indicate that the ownership share of institutional investors and board size have negative effects on information asymmetry, while the ratio of non-executive members to board size and separation variable have no significant effects on information asymmetry. 
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Article Type: Research Paper | Subject: C01 - Econometrics|E22 - Capital; Investment; Capacity
Received: 2012/02/28 | Accepted: 2013/03/1 | Published: 2015/01/21

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