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The present study seeks to analyze Iran's oil extraction and export behavior within the framework of membership in OPEC as an important player in the oil market and to propose a policy for the post-sanction period. The analysis of strategic relations shows that oil economies differ in terms of the economic, demographic and petroleum components, and the need for oil revenues. Thus, these countries can be classified into two types of saver and expender, with different rates of depreciation. This typology and bargaining between the two groups largely determines the behavior of the players within OPEC. Accordingly, after designing an innovative model and estimating it during 2001-2017, the results indicate a strong and significant relationship between discount rate of oil countries with the previous components. In particular, oil market faces an increasing impatience and general tendency to accelerate oil exports in response to the emergence of shale oil and the change in oil market outlook. Accordingly, Iran's current role in OPEC seems nonoptimal, and economic, demographic and oil components indicate the need to adopt and enhance Iran's extraction capacity and recovery rates, while continuing membership in OPEC.

Keywords: Oil Market Game Theory OPEC Discount Rate

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